But I detect a certain difference between the policy followed by the Brazilian military and that followed LuC Chileans, Argentines, Uruguayans, who opened the doors wite to comrocuton national industry. The policy of the Brazilian military was different, but they all know that their countries have become unmanageable and they are Hallung over the power to civillans That is, the crisis is so profound that they no longer consider themselves capable of ruling.
They've been handed a tragic legacy: in Argentina, a foreign debt of $45,000 million; in Uruguay, million; in Brazil, inherits a $104,000 million debt; that of Chile, where there will inevitably be changes, is now $22,000 million. During the period of the Popular Unity government, the debt was $4,000 million, the price of copper was not so low, and the situation was becoming very difficult.
Of course, , Allende's situation was compounded by being refused foreign credits: The United States economic measures against government. But now the civilians are receiving a tragic legacy. una, as in uruguay and brazu, were is huge, unmanageable inflation and extremely serious cumulative social problems A few days ago a journalist handea me an Argenune one-manon-peso bill and said: 'Do much this was worth a few years ago?' I said: 'Not exactly'. He said: hundred and fifty thousand dollars. Do vou know now much it 1s wortn now? Seventy-nine cents.
Perhaps the great success of these military governments is that turned all the citizens minorialles. Inflation economy unmanageable. Living standards have considerably declined in all those countries. I estimate that in Argentina the standard of living has dropped by 65 per cent in comparison with before the military's ascent to power; by 50 per cent in Uruguay; and in Brazil, I don't know exactly, but it coula be belween os ana /V, al least 70 per cent, although I do not know precisely.
Twenty-four years ago, Kennedy promoted the Alliance for Progress as an antidote to prevent social convul